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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, genetic research has ascended the list of national
research priorities. From among the many weighty claims on the fisc,
Congress has chosen to provide significant federal support for the
Human Genome Initiative, a project aimed at mapping the complete set
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of genetic instructions that form the structure of inherited attributes.
Geneticists anticipate that the project will disclose important new information on human development and disease. Some go further. One
influential scientist remarked that this work is "the ultimate answer to
the commandment 'Know thyself.' ""
The decision to fund this Initiative, the largest biology project in
the history of science, at a time of significant budgetary constraints suggests its political currency.2 Scientists have recently developed genetic
tests, familiar from the diagnostic technologies used to identify genetic
abnormalities in fetuses and newborn infants, to find the markers indicating predisposition to certain single-gene disorders such as Huntington's disease. This success has bred the hope that more complex
conditions, such as cancer, drug dependency, and mental illness, will
ultimately be predictable and has enhanced the appeal of theories that
explain human behavior in biological terms.3 Expectant parents now
demand chromosomal testing of their babies before they are born 4 and
infertile couples often put considerable resources into the creation of
genetically-related offspring. Institutions, including employers, insurers,
and educators, look to biological tests to guide placement and avoid
risk.'
Interest in genetics is also apparent in legal discourse, which has a
long and enduring tradition of using evolutionary models to explain the
development of the law.' More recently, however, there has been a shift
from essentially metaphorical uses of genetic concepts to an incorporation of biological principles into the substance of legal doctrine. Thus,
many states now mandate the use of genetic testing for conditions such
as phenylketonuria (PKU) in newborn infants.7 Moreover, genetic information is increasingly suggested as a tool for deciding cases in a wide
1. JERRY E. BISHOP & MICHAEL WALDHOLZ, GENOME 218 (1990 (quoting
fessor of Biology at Harvard University).
2. The project is expected to cost approximately three billion dollars
years. ROBERT PROCTOR, VALUE-FREE SCIENCE 5 (1991).
3. James D. Watson, The Human Genome Project: Past,Present, and
44 (1990); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES & U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,
GENETIC INHERITANCE; THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT (1990).
4. NEIL A. HOLTZMAN, PROCEED WITH CAUTION 107-08 (1989).

Walter Gilbert, Proover three to fifteen
Future, 248

SCIENCE

UNDERSTANDING OUR

5. DOROTHY NELKIN & LAURENCE TANCREDI, DANGEROUS DIAGNOSTICS: THE SOCIAL POWER OF
BIOLOGICAL INFORMATION 51-132 (1989); Dorothy Nelkin and Laurence Tancredi, Classify and Control: Genetic Information in the Schools, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 51 (1991).
6. See, e.g., Oliver W. Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443
(1899); E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 38
(1985) (providing a comprehensive survey).
7. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF INBORN ERRORS OF METABOLISM, GENETIC SCREENING: PROGRAMS, PRINCIPLES, AND RESEARCH 44-87 (1975); Jane E. Brody,
A Search to Bar Retardationin a New Generation, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1990, at B9.
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variety of fields, including torts," criminal, 9 trust and estate,1 0 family,1 1
and labor law. 2 Some of these applications are fairly unremarkable. In
certain areas, the law has traditionally asked questions that require factual answers based on the best information that science has to offer.
For example, the law has embraced the use of DNA "fingerprints" for
identification.' 3 While these applications raise difficult questions, such
as which scientific methods are sufficiently probative to be admissible
into evidence and how courts should utilize statistical methods of reporting scientific results, these issues have received considerable academic attention.14 Accordingly, it is not our purpose to comment on this
facet of the law's use of genetics. Similarly, we do not address the many
important regulatory and patenting issues that fall within the accepted
framework for dealing with technological change.
Rather, our focus is on the impact of genetic research on traditional
legal concepts. Genetics has profoundly altered the perception of personhood within our culture. This change has, in turn, challenged many
of the core principles on which current norms are based and has compelled lawmakers to reconsider the legal rules that mediate the relationships among persons and between individuals and the broader
community. Thus, we see this research as influencing not only the factual answers available to the decisionmaking process, but also the questions that are framed and the terms that are used in the debate.
In some sense there is no surprise even here. No longer viewed as a
self-contained discipline,' 5 in recent decades the law has absorbed contributions from such fields as economics,' 6 philosophy, 17 literature,'
and physics.' 9 Biology's concern with the functioning of the human entity makes it a natural place for the law to look for further illumination.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 87-88.
9. See infra notes 92-108 and accompanying text.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 82-86.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 59-81.
12. See infra part III.C.
13. See, e.g., People v. Wesley, 140 Misc.2d 306, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Albany County Ct. 1988)
(discussing the admissibility of DNA fingerprinting).
14. See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v.
United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980); Larry Gostin, Genetic Discrimination: The Use of Genetically Based Diagnostic and Prognostic Tests by Employers and
Insurers, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 109, 113-15 (1991).
15. See Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987,
100 HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987).
16. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976); Guido
Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distributionand the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
17. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
18. See, e.g., Symposium: Law and Literature, 60 TEx. L. REV. 373 (1982).
19. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvatureof ConstitutionalSpace: What Lawyers Can
Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1989).

316

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:313

But just as care must be exercised in accepting the wisdom of economists, philosophers, and literary critics, so the trend toward what we
will call "genetic essentialism" deserves more study than it has received
so far.20
Part II begins by elucidating our notion of genetic essentialism
with reference to the expectations and rhetoric of scientists. This Part
demonstrates that biological assumptions have pervaded this culture's
understanding of the person. Part III utilizes the concept of personhood
developed in Part II to illustrate the normative sacrifices that are made
as biological conceptions of personhood achieve salience within the law.
Because research in human genetics is rapidly advancing, its appeal to
lawmakers is unlikely to abate. Part IV examines the sources of this
attraction and suggests guidelines for translating the intuition that biological advances are relevant to current problems into methods for furthering social objectives that are consistent with long-held principles of
justice.
II.

GENETIC ESSENTIALISM

Anthropological studies demonstrate that personhood is a sociallydefined concept. That is, the understanding of what it means to be a
person and what rights are associated with personhood varies from culture to culture and, within a culture, changes over time according to
external circumstances. Victor Turner describes how social rituals of
naming or passage, for example, establish the individual's social identity and provide "a set of templates or models which are, at one level,
periodical reclassifications of reality and man's relationship to society,
nature, and culture."21 To Clifford Geertz, the ways in which persons
are defined "are not given in the nature of things-they are '22
historically
applied.
individually
and
maintained,
socially
constructed,
Examples from cultures other than our own illustrate that the social identity of an individual is not a universal concept, but rather is
defined by the community as part of its system of social relationships.
Many societies perceive the person in terms of group identification. For
20. Another reason for skepticism about the manner in which the law has amalgamated biological scholarship comes from a comparison between the conceptualization of genetics found in
law and popular culture on the one hand and scientific literature on the other. We believe that the
legal materials tend to be dominated by popular views. Accordingly, we have some concern that
the law is using a view of genetics that has already been filtered through an acculturation process
with an agenda of its own. We hope to specifically address this concern in a subsequent article.
21. VICTOR W. TURNER, THE RITUAL PROCESS 128-29 (1969).
22. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 363-64 (1973). See also RICHARD A.
SCHWEDER, THINKING THROUGH CULTURES: EXPEDITIONS IN CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY
EGORY OF THE PERSON (Michael Currithers et al. eds., 1985).

(1991);

THE CAT-
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example, in Bali, the use of personal names is usually avoided.23 More
important are names that indicate relationships, such as birth order,
status, and most commonly, familial relationships. Because a person is
understood contextually, names will change in the course of a lifetime
to reflect status in the family. A man is called by the name of his children, prefaced by "father-of," or "grandfather-of," or "great-grandfather-of." Thus, personhood in Bali is defined by social placement.24
Most Bantu languages have no term that corresponds to the word
"person. 12 5 In Bantu society, individuals have personal names but the
names usually signify status in a group. The Bantu notion of person is
defined by family relationships that include the unborn and the dead.2 6
As in Bali, perpetuation of the community underlies the definition of
personhood, so that women who are unable to give birth are considered
7
nonpersons.1
In contrast to cultures that perceive the person in relational terms
are those that emphasize the importance of individual characteristics.
In these cultures, psychological definitions emphasize the internal developmental factors that form personality and shape identity. 28 In western philosophy, personhood rests on the individual's ability to exercise
free choice. 29 According to Derek Parfit: "[T]o be a person, a being
must be self-conscious, aware of its identity and its continued existence
over time."3 0 Although these theoretical definitions of personhood incorporate notions of consciousness, psychological connectedness, and
ability to reason or shape life in accordance with a plan, the history of
slavery and of gender discrimination reflects another view. As feminist
and black writers have noted, biological differences have often determined who qualifies as a person deserving of rights.3 1
23. GEERTZ, supra note 22, at 368-69.
24. According to Clifford Geertz, the Bali culture defines personhood as a "particular location within a persisting, indeed an eternal, metaphysical order." Id.
25. Willy De Craemer, A Cross-culturalPerspectiveon Personhood,61 MILBANK MEMORIAL
FUND Q. 19, 22 (1983).
26. Id. at 23. See also John Beattie, Review Article: Representations of the Self in Traditional Africa, 50 AFRICA 313 (1980).
27.

De Craemer, supra note 25, at 24.

28. ERIK H. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY (2d ed. 1963).
29. Gary Watson, Free Agency, 72 J. PHIL. 205 (1975); SUSAN WOLF, FREEDOM WITHIN REASON (1990).
30.

DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 202 (1984).

31. See, e.g., A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Property First,Humanity
Second: The Recognition of the Slave's Human Nature in Virginia Civil Law, 50 OHIO ST. L.J.

511, 514, 525-34 (1989) (demonstrating that the human nature of slaves, and the rights of slaves,
were recognized only to the extent that they did not compromise the owner's property rights); id.
at 538 (noting that free blacks, whites, and slaves were treated and conceptualized differently);
Dorothy E. Roberts, PunishingDrug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and
the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1438 (1991) (noting that the way in which pregnant
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Modern science provides support for defining personhood biologically, according to genetic characteristics. Geneticists are uncovering
the inherited qualities that influence the course of life from childhood
to old age. By scanning the sequences of DNA that form the basis of
our inheritance, geneticists are detecting the markers that indicate predisposition to a growing number of hereditary diseases. 3 2 As more markers are identified, scientists anticipate that tests will be available to
indicate predisposition not only to single-gene disorders, such as Huntington's disease, cystic fibrosis, and hemophilia, but also to complex
conditions and behaviors, facilitating prediction of mental illness,
Alzheimer's disease, hyperactivity, heart disease, certain forms of can33
cer, and susceptibility to alcoholism, addiction, and even violence.
Such tests yield only probabilistic information, for the relationship between predisposition and actual expression generally remains unknown.
Yet expectations about the predictive possibilities of genetic tests have
created a new category of person-the presymptomatically ill, the person "at risk."3 4
Research in molecular biology has revitalized those studies in psychology that have long claimed the genetic origins of intelligence, personality, and behavior. 5 Despite the continuing controversy over the
relative influence of environment and heredity, behavioral psychologists
studying identical twins and adopted children claim that heredity determines specific behaviors and personality traits.36 Developmental psychologist Jerome Kagan, for example, has observed a correspondence
between shyness and an inherited variation in the physiology of the
brain.37 He suggests that other traits, such as the sense of morality, are
similarly determined through biology.38 And the twin studies of Thomas
of biological determinism, have attained a
Bouchard, long a proponent
39
new respectability.
women slaves were treated "serves as a powerful metaphor for the evils of a fetal protection policy
that denies the humanity of the mother"); Robin West, Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U. CH. L.
REV. 1, 58, 71 (1988).
32. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,MAPPING OUR GENES 3-4 (1988).
33. HOLTZMAN, supra note 4, at 88-105.
34. See Sophie Alexander & Marc J.N.C. Keirse, Formal Risk Scoring, in A GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE CARE IN PREGNANCY AND CHILDBIRTH 28, 29 (Murray Enkin et al. eds. 1989).
35. For a review of this controversial field, including the work of A.R. Jensen, see LEON J.
KAMIN, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF I.Q. (1974).

36. Sandra Scarr, Three Cheers for Behavioral Genetics: Winning the War and Losing Our
Identity, 17 BEHAVIORAL GENETCS 219-28 (1987).
37. Jerome Kagan et al. Biological Bases of Childhood Shyness, 240 SCIENCE 167 (1988).
38. Robert Crum, Temperamental Research, HARVARD MAGAZINE Jan.-Feb. 1988, at 6 (quoting Jerome Kagan).

39. Thomas J. Bouchard, Jr. et al. Sources of Human PsychologicalDifferences: The Minnesota Study of Twins Reared Apart, 250 SCIENCE 223 (1990).
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The public impact of genetics has been significant. Therapeutic
benefits are far in the future, and scientists generally qualify assertions
regarding the extent to which heredity determines complex conditions
or behavior. However, they have presented their research in ways that
are likely to attract considerable lay attention. According to Charles R.
Scriver, president of the Society for Human Genetics, this research has
made "inroads on the medical mind; ' 40 Robert Pasnau, president of the
American Psychiatric Association speaks of the "remedicalization of
psychiatry."' 41 The future lies in genetic "tendencies" says the scientific
director of a major biotechnology firm.4 2 In numerous public speeches
and interviews geneticists have called the large scale project to map the
human genome a "quest for the Holy Grail," an effort to create the
"Book of Man." They talk about the "Oracle of DNA" or the
"Blueprint of Life." Daniel Koshland, the editor of Science, has
claimed the nature-nurture controversy over. 43 "Our fate is in our
genes," says James Watson, director of the Human Genome Initiative.4 4
And in public presentations, Walter Gilbert, who leads the effort to sequence the genome, pulls out a compact disk and announces to his au'45
dience, "This is you."
Society appropriates science to support prevailing values, sometimes extending it beyond the limits of well-accepted knowledge. Thus,
the enthusiasm of some members of the scientific community draws
public attention to genetic relationships. Media articles on reproductive
technologies imply that women should reproduce at all costs for they
will be emotionally "desperate" without their own children. 4 6 Those unable to conceive seek out surrogate mothers in order to have genetically
related children. 47 Films and articles on parent-child relationships suggest the importance of genetic integrity, of "flesh and blood. ' 4 Genealogy services are flourishing as people pursue their roots. "How to"
40. Charles R. Scriver, PresidentialAddress: Physiological Genetics - Who Needs It?, 40 AM.
J. HUM. GENETICS 199, 208 (1987).
41. Robert Pasnau, PresidentialAddress, NEW PHYSICIAN, April 1988, at 30.
42. Alan Smith, quoted in Christopher Joyce, Genes reach the medical market, NEW SCIENTIST, July 16, 1987, at 45, 50.
43. Daniel E. Koshland, Jr., Nature, Nurture, and Behavior, 235 SCIENCE 1445 (1987).
44. Leon Jaroff, The Gene Hunt, TIME, March 20, 1989, at 62, 67.
45. See, e.g., Walter Gilbert, Current State of the H.G.I., Harvard Univ. Dibner Center Lecture (June 15, 1990).
46. Sarah Franklin, Deconstructing 'Desperateness:The Social Construction of Infertility
in PopularRepresentations of the New Reproductive Technologies, in THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES 200 (Maureen McNeil et al. eds. 1990).
47. The motivation, of course, is not always genetic. People may also seek reproductive technologies because of the shortage of healthy infants and the fear of adopting drug-addicted babies.
48. See, e.g., popular articles on the desperation of adopted children, John McCormick, and
Pat Wingert, Whose Child Am I Anyway?, NEWSWEEK 58 (Special Edition, Summer 1991).
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books and articles written for adoptees stress the importance of finding
one's natural or birth parents and suggest that knowing one's genetic
heritage is a way to define identity.4 9 The very concept of identity is
defined more in biological than in social terms.
The interest in genetic identity includes a preoccupation with biological determinism. ° Among the traits attributed to genetics are
mental illness, homosexuality, aggressive personality, dangerousness,
job and educational success, exhibitionism, the tendency to commit arson, stress, risk-taking, shyness, social potency, traditionalism, and even
zest for life.5 1 These complex conditions frequently are described as directly inherited, as if they were single-gene disorders.52 Journalists reporting on behavioral research exhibit a growing acceptance of genetic
determinism53 Scientists' speculations about genetic influences are interpreted as proof that social problems such as crime and poverty are
less the by-products of destructive environments than the result of genetic endowment.5 4
Reflecting similar assumptions, books and articles discuss genetics
as the basis for future health, capabilities, and career choices.5 5 Medical
journalists advise readers to make genograms that contain all the information they can find about their relatives, or to take family health pedigrees to "zero in on hereditary diseases lurking in the future. 5' 6 With
the availability of new reproductive technologies, choosing a baby can
become like catalog shopping. Fertility clinics keep computer profiles of
donors correlated with a list of desirable traits. Moreover, the availability of prenatal tests has encouraged new standards of perfection. The
idea that genes have power and will determine the behavior and health
of one's offspring has spurred a search for "the perfect baby-every
'57
parent's dream.
Observing these trends, we define a concept called "genetic essentialism." Genetic essentialism posits that personal traits are predictable
49. Richard Weizel, A Voice from the Past, PARENTING 90 (Oct. 1991); Michael D'Antonio,
The Adoption Revolution, 6 CHLD 118 (Nov. 1991).
50. A computer search of the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, and the Washington
Post, from 1984 to 1987 yielded 416 articles relating genetics to behavior. Dorothy Nelkin,
Hereditarian Themes in American Popular Culture, Proposal to National Institutes of Health
(1991).
51. Id. at 16-17.
52. Id. at 17.
53. An article in Time reported that twin studies are "one more proof that parenting has its
limits." John Leo, Exploring the Traits of Twins, TIME, Jan. 12, 1987, at 63.
54. JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE (1985).
55. MYRA V. GORMLEY, FAMILY DISEASES: ARE You AT RIsK? (1989).
56. See, e.g., Nancy Shute, How Healthy is your Family Tree?, HIPPOCRATES, Jan.-Feb. 1988,
at 88-89; GORMLEY, supra note 55.
57. News documentary, hosted by Barbara Walters (ABC television broadcast June 20, 1990).
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and permanent, determined at conception, "hard-wired" into the
human constitution. If comprehensively known and understood these
inherent qualities would largely explain past performance and could
predict future behavior. Standing in sharp contrast with the relational
definitions of personhood observed in some societies, this ideology minimizes the importance of social context. By stressing the importance of
immutable biological qualities, genetic essentialism also differs from
traditions centered on the importance of life experiences in determining
behavior.
III. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS

Scientific and legal changes are interrelated. Both the cultural beliefs that shape science and the knowledge that emerges from science
are readily incorporated into legal doctrine."8 Thus, the transformation
of "personhood" into an essentially genetic concept has important consequences for legal thought. If personal identity is no longer understood
in relational terms, then doctrines dealing with community-relationships among people-must be reconsidered. Because genetic essentialism is a deterministic concept, it negates assumptions
about free will, thereby putting into question much of the law concerning responsibility, intent, condemnation, and punishment. Because of
the limitations that genetic understanding places on human potential,
essentialism challenges the principle that equivalent opportunities
should be extended to all. This Part does not contain a comprehensive
typology of the legal areas in which genetic themes have emerged.
Rather, we have selected representative issues and cases in which essentialist arguments are applied to illustrate the normative sacrifices made
when such arguments are accepted as dispositive.
A.

Community

When the family was regarded as the primary setting for care, education, and emotional support, stability was one of the law's central
goals; familial relationships were rarely disturbed. Divorce was difficult.
Courts often resolved paternity disputes using devices such as Lord
Mansfield's rule, which estopped a husband from denying that he fa58.

See, e.g., BRUNO J. LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIFE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUC(1979); KARIN D. KNORR-CETINA, THE MANUFACTURE OF KNOWLEDGE
(1981) (noting that sociological and ethnographic studies suggest that science is a socially-constructed activity, shaped by cultural beliefs and social assumptions); ELISABETH NOELLE-NEUMANN,
THE SPIRAL OF SILENCE 123-33 (1984); Maxwell E. McCombs & Donald L. Shaw, The AgendaSetting Function of the Mass Media, 36 PUB. OPINION Q. 176 (1972) (suggesting that media influence plays a critical role in shaping and expressing public conceptions, setting cognitive agendas
and initiating the formation of attitudes among both professional and lay persons).
TION OF SCIENTIFIC FACTS
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thered the children born to his wife during his marriage, 5 or equitable
estoppel, which prevented a mother from denying the fatherhood of a
man whom she had permitted to nurture her child.6 0 These estoppel
rules may have originated in a nontechnological society's search for a
method to determine the fact of paternity.6 But they also preserved
the status quo. By assuring children continued contact with the significant persons of their lives, these rules evidenced the high value placed
on social relationships.
Similar considerations motivated adoption law. The principal concerns were stability, providing the adoptee with a fresh start, and protecting the integrity of ongoing relationships.2 States created a shield
of privacy between the family and society and fostered a legal fiction of
natural birth. In a majority of jurisdictions, original birth certificates
and adoption records were sealed.6 3 Although some of these states permitted disclosure for "good cause"-principally medical or financial necessity-the test was usually stringent. 4 In some states birth parents
6
enjoyed an absolute right to anonymity. 5
When the person is reconceptualized as a genetic entity and forging
genetic relationships becomes a goal, legal protection for these social
interests weakens. For example, Johnson v. Calvert,6 6 a case the press
described as "genetics vs. environment, '67 was a dispute over the custody of a child conceived through in vitro fertilization (IVF). The
Calverts donated their gametes (egg and sperm) to create a so-called
59. Goodright v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (1777). Modification of the rule to permit rebuttal
through blood tests has been going on for some time. See, e.g., Kusior v. Silver, 354 P.2d 657 (Cal.
1960).
60. See, e.g., Brenda J. Runner, Protecting A Husband's Parental Rights When His Wife
Disputes the Presumptionof Legitimacy, 28 J. FAM. L. 115 (1989-90). Cf. Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
491 U.S. 110 (1989) (upholding against a due process challenge a California law dating from 1872
that presumes that a child born to a married woman living with her husband is a child of the
marriage).
61. That is, Lord Mansfield's rule infers fatherhoood from matrimony; the estoppel argument
reasons that the more contemporaneous the action, the more truthful it is likely to be. Cf. FED. R.
EvID. 803(3) (providing that present sense impressions are exceptions to the hearsay rule because
contemporaneousness is an indication of truth).
62. See, e.g, In re Anonymous, 390 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1976) (describing the benefits of
confidentiality).
63. See Melissa Arndt, Comment, Severed Roots: The Sealed Adoption Records Controversy, 6 N. ILL. U.L. REv. 103, 104-05 (1986).,
64. See, e.g., In re Hayden, 435 N.Y.S.2d 541 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (holding that fear of
exposure to DES was a sufficient justification for disclosure); Dwyer v. Dwyer, 10 N.E.2d 344 (Ill.
1937) (holding that biological parents remain liable to a child if the adoptive parents cannot provide for the child).
65. See, e.g., ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 40, § 1522.3(e) (West Supp. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1141 (1991); Comment, supra note 63, at 121-23.
66. No. X 63 31 90 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1990).
67. Seth Mydans, Surrogate Denied Custody of Child, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct 23, 1990, at A14.
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test tube baby. Because the wife could not sustain a pregnancy, the
couple hired Johnson to carry the fertilized embryo to term in her
womb. The dispute began after Johnson refused to relinquish the child,
Christopher, at his birth. When genetic tests revealed a high probability
that the Calverts were Christopher's biological parents, the court
awarded them sole custody.
The result in Johnson is not remarkable; the significance of the
case lies in the basis of the decision. The court could simply have enforced the contract according to its terms.6 8 Alternatively, the court
could have used the traditional standard of the child's best interest and
weighed Johnson's claim as the person who nurtured and birthed the
fetus against the value of placing Christopher in the marital home that
had motivated his conception and planned for his rearing. But although
the court acknowledged Johnson's arguments, it easily dismissed
70
them."' Noting the tremendous need for genetically related children,
the court utilized the Minnesota twin studies to justify a decision for
the Calverts.7 1 The court explained:
We know more and more about traits now, how you walk, talk and everything else,
all sorts of things that develop out of your genes, how long you're going to live, all
things being equal, when your immune system is going to break down, what diseases you may be susceptible to. They have upped the intelligence ratio of genetics
to 70 percent now."
68. In the then-current literature on surrogacy, it was argued that such contracts were unconscionable for exploiting the surrogate. See, e.g., MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD
(1988) (arguing that surrogacy contracts should be voidable by the surrogate); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability,100 HARv. L. REV. 1849 (1987) (stating that surrogacy is against the
public interest); Patricia J. Williams, On Being the Object of Property, 14 SIGNs 5, 13-16 (1988)
(analogizing surrogacy to slavery); Susan Frelich Appleton, Surrogacy Arrangements and the Conflict of Laws, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 399, 400 n.2 (citing legislative activity in the surrogacy area).
However, the court could have taken the position that, since the contract met the state's formal
requirements for validity, concerns for the surrogate should be left to the legislature.
69. According to the court, "there is still much disagreement as to the influence of gestational environment," Johnson,at 8. See also id. at 10 (stating that "[i]n this case, we have a family
unit, all genetically related. You have Mark Calvert, Crispina Calvert and their child they call
Christopher: three people in a family unit."). To its credit, the court also devoted considerable
effort to advising the legislature on protections for safeguarding the interests of the surrogate.
70. Id. at 11.
71. Id. at 7.
72. Id. at 8.
The point of this discussion is not to imply that the court should have decided the case for
Johnson, or that its suggestions that the legislature require psychological evaluation and allow only
mothers to enter into surrogacy contracts were not valuable. In fact, we believe that surrogate
contracts should be enforced. However, we reach that conclusion on reasoning similar to that
enunciated by Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood:
An Opportunityfor Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 297. Given the Johnson court's views on
the issue of the surrogate's rights, its decision relies too heavily on the genetic relationship of the
child to the Calverts.
See also In re RLL, 386 S.E.2d 852 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (debating the extent to which the
genetic basis for the father's alcoholism should influence the custody determination).
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Thus, the court defined the child as a genetic entity-a packet of
genes-on the assumption that shared genes are the crucial basis of
human relationships."3
The same theme is discernable in other family law materials.
Courts may speak of the problems created when long-term social relationships are broken, but the genetic tie increasingly receives emphasis. 7 4 For example, in Commonwealth ex rel. Coburn v. Coburn8 the
court dismissed an ex-husband's petition for visitation when genetic
tests revealed that Angie Lee, the child he had nurtured for ten years,
was not his biological daughter. Although the decision was reversed on
appeal, 76 several of the justices adopted a biological perspective. Concurring opinions, one of which spoke of "knowledge of one's biological
parents and hereditary history [as] crucial in ordering one's affairs and
making life's decisions,"' 7 approved the use of blood tests to assure the
child knowledge of her biological father.7 8 Apparently, the court did not
consider the danger this genetic information posed to the relationship
between Angie Lee and the man she considered her father.
Genetic essentialism has also affected other parental relationships.
Thus, legal protection generally is not accorded to the tie between a
child born to a lesbian mother and her non-gestational partner no matter how long the relationship between the parties has endured.79 In
adoption, the genetic perception of personhood is manifest in the recog73. The influence of genetics is highlighted by the fact-unmentioned by the court, but evident in the illustrations in the press-that the Calverts were white and Johnson was black.
74. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Coburn v. Coburn, 558 A.2d 548, 553 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1989). See also John Lawrence Hill, What Does it Mean to be a "Parent"?The Claims of Biology
as the Basis for ParentalRights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353 (1991) (contrasting genetic and gestational
claims to parenthood with arguments based on the intent to conceive a child).
75. 558 A.2d 548 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
76. The appellate court took into account the "chaos to the child's emotional well-being"
that would occur if her relationship to the ex-husband were severed. Id. at 553 (Cirillo J.,
concurring).
77. Id. at 554 (Cirillo, J., concurring).
78. See id. (emphasizing the importance of "knowledge of one's biological parents and hereditary history"); id. at 555 (questioning the wisdom of denying the child the right to know her
biological father) (Brosky, J., concurring).
An interesting contrast to this case is provided by In re the Paternity of D.L.H., 419 N.W.2d
283 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987), in which the court held that even after an H.L.A. blood test excludes a
husband as the father of his wife's child, the principle of equitable estoppel permits his paternity
to be recognized if its recognition is in the best interest of the child.
79. See, e.g., In re Alison D., 572 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991) (denying parental rights to the
former partner of a lesbian mother despite a continuous, six-year relationship with the child because she was a "biological stranger" to the child); Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1991) (denying visitation rights to a nongestational partner, despite recognition of de
facto parent status, on the theory that the natural parent is of paramount importance). See generally, Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the
Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other NontraditionalFamilies, 78 GEo. L.J. 459 (1990).
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nition of claims of genealogical bewilderment.80 Despite the disruption
caused in the adoptive family, and without regard to either the biological family's reliance-based interest in confidentiality or the impact on
future adoptions, the essentialist view mandates that sealed adoption
records be opened. Knowing one's roots is considered a prerequisite to
becoming a functional adult."'
The contrast between the essentialist and relational perspectives
emerges sharply in proposals to use genetic information to craft intestate succession laws. John Beckstrom, for example, has suggested that
the law governing intestate succession should be structured to give a
decedent's assets to those most able to perpetuate the individual's
genes. Beckstrom's argument begins with the proposition that intestate
80. See Elton B. Klibanoff, Genealogical Information in Adoption: The Adoptee's Quest
and the Law, 11 FAM. L. Q. 185, 193 (1977).
81. See, e.g., In re Dixon, 323 N.W.2d 549, 550 n.2 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (quoting a psychiatrist's statement that "there is a generally deep-seated need on the part of adoptees to know their
biological origins, regardless of the quality of family life in their adopted families").
Analogously, the Wisconsin legislature has recently required mothers seeking state aid to participate in affiliation proceedings. While it is likely that the State is partially motivated by a desire
to conserve its resources, the legislative history evinces a concern for the interest of children in
identifying their fathers. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 767.075(1)(a), 767.45 (West Supp. 1990) (making the
state the real party in interest in paternity proceedings when certain applications for state aid are
made).
Ignored in the quest to determine the identity of both parents is the substantial literature
indicating that when parents are not united, their children's interests may be best served by giving
one of the parents exclusive control. See, e.g., JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTEREST
OF THE CHILD (1979). Cf. Joan G. Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody Decrees,
94 YALE L.J. 757 (1985) (noting problems with disrupting ongoing custody arrangements); Michael
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (holding that even when the natural father has an established
relationship with a child, traditional perceptions of the family permit the state to presume irrebuttably that the wife's husband is the child's father); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (holding
that a biological father who lacks a relationship with his child should not be allowed to interfere
with an adoption that is in the child's best interest); In re the Adoption of Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d
1059 (Okla. 1985) (holding that a father may not interfere with an adoption that is in the child's
best interest, notwithstanding the applicability of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 19011963 (1988), which is specifically aimed at protecting the stability and cultural linkages of Indian
tribes). But see In re the Guardianship of Q.G.M., 808 P.2d 684 (Okla. 1991) (holding that a tribe
has a broad right to intervene in guardianship decisions that could potentially undermine Indian
family ties). See also 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)(B)(i) (requiring a mother seeking benefits through the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children program to divulge the name of her child's biological
father). See generally, Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed:Limits of PrivateResponsibility and the Public Interest, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 367 (arguing that social reciprocity rather than
genetic reciprocity deserves greater attention).
Similar arguments can produce an opposite outcome. Emphasis on genetic identity may lead
courts to leave children with their biological families under conditions that might previously have
led to a termination of parental rights. See, e.g., In re J.J.B., 369 N.W.2d 593 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985) (leaving a child in the custody of a schizophrenic, suicidal mother). Cf. In re the Appeal in
Cochise County Juvenile Action No. 5666-J, 650 P.2d 459 (Ariz. 1982) (en banc) (permitting a
mother who allowed one sick child to die untreated because she believed in miracles to keep her
remaining children, absent a showing that the others were genetically predisposed to the condition
that killed their brother).
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succession laws are intended to reflect the desires of the owner of
wealth: because every organism that survived the process of natural selection did so because it was "programmed"-"hard-wired"-to ensure
the endurance of its specific genetic heritage, a genes-based distribution
82
best mirrors an individual's real desires.
In societies that define personhood in relational terms, Beckstrom's
argument would seem extraordinary. Even assuming that the goal of
intestate succession law is to further the wishes of decedents who fail to
write wills, and that genes influence those wishes, there is no special
reason to believe that input from the genes would override other values.
Indeed, as Beckstrom himself admits, surveys of living individuals and
examinations of actual wills reveal distribution patterns that are
sharply at odds with his proposal.8 3 Although Beckstrom offers theories
to explain this divergence, his explanations do not make the affirmative
case that a genes-based distribution reflects actual desires. His principal
84
argument is that other distribution schemes are culturally induced.
While this may be so, Beckstrom offers no reason for favoring distribution preferences based on biology over those created through
socialization.
Beckstrom's assumption that the goal of fulfilling the unstated
wishes of intestates entirely governs the law of intestate succession is
85
also troubling. The Uniform Probate Code (UPC) makes this claim,
but even a cursory review of the UPC and state law reveals that this
proposition is simplistic. Provision is made for spouses because jurisdictions consider the spousal relationship to include rights in the other's
estate, for minor children because parents have legal obligations to support them, and for parents because states wish to protect their welfare
systems from claims by relatives of the wealthy."8 A scheme that ignores
82. See JOHN H. BECKSTROM, SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE LAW (1985). See also EDWARD 0. WILSON,
SOCIOBIOLOGY: THE NEW SYNTHESIS (1975).
83. Similarly, state intestacy laws generally do not follow Beckstrom's proposal. For example,
intestate succession laws typically do not distinguish between the children of males and females,
although Beckstrom makes this distinction on the theory that males, but not females, require
proof of parenthood. Similarly, state intestacy laws rarely make the distinction Beckstrom does
between adopted and biological children. See BECKSTROM, supra note 82, at 28, 49-54. Furthermore, Beckstrom would distribute an estate to the decedent's siblings rather than parents even
though most laws and wills favor the latter. Id. at 35-37. Yet it is likely that some people who
decline to write wills do so because they are satisfied with the intestate scheme.
84. See, e.g., BECKSTROM, supra note 82, at 27.
85. UNIF. PROB. CODE pt.1, General Comment, 8 U.L.A. 56 (1983) (asserting that "[t]he Code
attempts to reflect the normal desire of the owner of wealth as to disposition of his property at
death").
86. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE pt.2, General Comment, 8 U.L.A. 73 (1983); John T. Gaubatz,
Notes Toward a Modern Wills Act, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 497, 501, 510 (1977); Deborah A. Batts, I
Didn't Ask to be Born: the American Law of Disinheritance and a Proposal for Change to a
System of Protected Inheritance,41 HASTINGS L.J. 1197, 1198-99 (1990).
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these public purposes denies not only the complex etiology of personal
preferences, but also significant interests of the community.
Beckstrom's handling of the tort law on emotional distress further
demonstrates the tradeoffs inherent in genetic essentialism. Claims for
compensation for the injury of watching another being harmed present
special problems for the legal system. There is a problem in narrowing
the class of cognizable claims, and there is difficulty in proof. Beckstrom suggests that both issues will be resolved if a genetic relationship
between the plaintiff and the person harmed is made an element of the
tort.8 7 This proposal would narrow the class of potential claimants, but
at the expense of ignoring the extent to which this tort is intended to
recognize and protect social rather than biological connectedness.8
B.

Responsibility

Genetic essentialism would also modify legal and moral concepts of
responsibility. In Beckstrom's treatment of emotional distress, the genetic connection between the plaintiff and the victim is used to define
responsibility. By circumscribing the level of liability, biological attributes of the victim determine the blameworthiness of the actor.8 9 Keying
liability to the victim's genetic endowment may be consistent with
restitutionary objectives of the law. Such a procedure, however, threat87.

BECKSTROM, supra note 82, at 99-113.

88. Cf. Martha Chamallas & Linda Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright:A History, 88 MICH. L. REv. 814 (1990) (tracing the relationship between the tort of emotional distress
and social mores).
89. Sellers v. Hendrickson, 360 N.E.2d 1235 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977), provides another example.
In this case, the defendant's car hit a child who subsequently experienced learning difficulties. At
trial, the defendant was allowed to introduce evidence on the personalities of the victim's brothers
and sisters and, through the testimony of a neurologist, suggested that the victim's condition was
caused by heredity rather than the incident. Although the evidence was introduced on the question
of proximate cause, it is likely that the jury used it to limit the amount of damages awarded. That
is, instead of assuming that the victim's future potential was unlimited, the jury used his genetic
heritage to limit liability. See also Willey v. Ketterer, 869 F.2d 648 (1st Cir. 1989) (illustrating the
extent to which a jury will use evidence of genetic diseases to exonerate an obstetrician for malpractice); Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42, 208-210 (Mo. App. 1988) (rejecting a claim based
on increased risk of cancer because the plaintiff's genetic predisposition to cancer was not determinable); Franklin v. Workers Compensation Appeals Board, 145 Cal. Rptr. 22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978)
(holding that a genetic predisposition to high cholesterol reduces the extent to which a disability
can be considered job-related).
As in other areas of the law, the genetic argument can work both ways in tort cases. In some
cases, genetic predispositions can favor the victim. See Starlings v. Ski Roundtop Corp., 493 F.
Supp. 507 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (allowing the use of evidence of genetic risk of arthritis to prove that an
injury was proximately caused by a skiing accident); Mose v. Brewer, 428 So. 2d 1212 (La. Ct. App.
1983) (finding that an accident aggravated the plaintiff's predisposition to diabetes). Cf. Alter v.
HHS, 508 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (using genetic predisposition to choose an early date for
the onset of a disability); Simmons v. HHS, 621 F. Supp. 1174 (W.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that
alcoholism is not a voluntary condition exempt from social security coverage on the basis of the
claimant's genetic predisposition to alcoholism).
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ens other goals. This regime would have perverse effects on the law's
capacity to deter wrongdoing whenever the potential victim's biological
limitations cannot be determined ex ante.9 0 Moreover, such a process
could be construed to symbolize a willingness to tolerate the victimization of people deemed genetically inferior. 9 1
The effect of essentialism is even more stark when the focus shifts
from the biological state of the victim to that of the actor. A comparison of two recent cases, Baker v. State Bar 92 and In re Ewaniszyk,93
foreshadows some of the problems that essentialism poses. Both cases
were disbarment proceedings based on misappropriation of client funds;
in both, the allegations of wrongdoing were uncontested and the misfeasance was attributable to substance abuse, which each petitioner had
apparently learned to control. Both cases were considered by the Supreme Court of California in 1990. Yet Ewaniszyk was disbarred while
Baker was merely placed on probation. The court found Baker's claims
for mitigation more compelling than Ewaniszyk's because Baker "had a
genetic predisposition to alcoholism." 9 4
Why should the genetic factor be dispositive if both attorneys
90. Cf. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALLAW 147-99 (3d ed. 1986).
Let X equal the optimum total level of care in a regime that considers all individuals equal.
For simplicity, the level of damages necessary to produce that level of care is also X. Given a
population of size n, the level of care theoretically directed at each individual under this regime is
X/n. Now consider what happens when damages are reduced by Y because some victims are found
to be genetically inferior. Actors now have three choices. First, they can maintain the former level
of care. Graduating damages that consider genetic endowments will not have the salutory effect of
creating the level of caretaking that is optimum for the society. Second, actors can reduce the total
amount of care they take to (X-Y). Under the genetic essentialist view, this is the optimum
amount of care. Since genetic inferiority is not usually determinable, each individual will receive a
level of care equal to (X-Y)/n. Hypothetically, however, certain individuals deserve the care available under the former rule-X/n. Thus, these people now receive suboptimal care. Finally, actors
can attempt to use their understanding of hereditary principles to target their care. This method
would permit actors' cultural stereotypes to govern caretaking even when, from a genetic perspective, such stereotypes may result in a misallocation of care.
91. See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Functionof Punishment in DOING & DESERVING,
ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 102-104 (1970). In Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2597
(1991), which upheld the use of a victim impact statement in the sentencing phase of a murder
trial, the Court distinguished between punishment and liability, asserting that even if the moral
guilt attached to two separate crimes is identical, punishment can be, and usually is, graded in
accordance with the assessment of harm caused by the criminal. Id. at 2605. However, because the
Court's comparison involved different crimes, it is apposite only if taking some human lives is
more acceptable than taking others. Even if there is a distinction between guilt and punishment,
the public may have difficulty perceiving the subtleties. Thus, there is still a significant risk that
correlating liability with the victim's genetic endowment will symbolize tolerance of the victimization of those deemed genetically inferior. Cf. id. at 2620 (expressing concern that victim-impact
statements will distract the jurors) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
92. 781 P.2d 1344 (Cal. 1989).
93. 788 P.2d 690 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
94. Id. at 696.
YSIS OF
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posed similar dangers to their clients and demonstrated equivalent capacity for rehabilitation? 5 One response is that Baker's genetic endowment relieves him of responsibility for his actions. This use of genetic
essentialism, however, is at odds with many aspects of traditional legal
doctrine. In criminal law, for example, whether one takbs a philosophic
or economic approach, some concept of responsibility is essential to
most forms of culpability. Guilt usually attaches only when an actor
who has performed an act that society has decided to discourage possesses free will.96 But if actors like Baker are "hard-wired" to perform
as they do, they arguably can never be justly punished or motivated to
conform. Thus, a genetic predisposition to criminality should be a full
defense, much like other conditions that obviate mens rea.17 Alternatively, the presence of a genetic disorder should mitigate the level of
punishment imposed, as it did in Baker.9 s
The court may have determined that Baker, knowing his predisposition, could more easily prevent a recurrence of his problem than could
EwaniszykY9 But this proposition raises other important questions.
First, many of the recently developed diagnostic tests for brain dysfunction are expensive;' 0 0 treatment is also likely to be costly. Thus,
unless jurisdictions assure indigent parties access to the relevant technologies, permitting biological defenses creates a risk that the poor will
receive less favorable treatment than the rich.' 01 Second, because research does not proceed evenly across all conditions, and because research priorities reflect social and cultural priorities, the genetic
component of some disorders will be understood before that of
others. 10 Some actors may therefore escape punishment while others
are convicted, not because of relative guilt, but because members of the
95. Of course, it is possible that Baker's acts were less serious, or his period of abstinence
longer, than Ewaniszyk's. However, the court did not rely on these differences.
96. Except those regarding compensatory motives, the remarks in this section also apply in
many areas of civil law.
97. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brennan, 504 N.E.2d 612 (Mass. 1987) (discussing whether a
molecular biological basis for criminal activity falls within the insanity defense).
98. Other conditions function in this way. The Model Penal Code, for example, allows evidence of mental disease or defect to mitigate certain penalties, even when the disorder is not severe enough to avoid cuipability. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02(2) (1985). See also State v. Lawrence,
541 N.E.2d 451 (Ohio 1989) (permitting evidence of post-traumatic stress disorder that was inadequate to prove an insanity defense to be used in mitigation at the penalty phase of a capital case).
99. See Baker, 781 P.2d at 1351 n.6.
100. As of 1989, Positron Emission Tomography, which produces evidence for a biological
defense of brain disorder, costs $2000-2500 per test. Nelkin & Tancredi, supra note 5, at 31.
101. Jurisdictions could, of course, ameliorate the problem by giving defendants the resources to avail themselves of the relevant technologies. Cf. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985)
(requiring the State to furnish an indigent defendant with a psychiatrist when the defendant's
mental health is at issue).
102. On the social construction of science, see supra note 58.
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former group suffer from problems that are better understood by the
medical community,1 °3 A case in point is Bowers v. Hardwick,0 4 in
which the Supreme Court relied on traditional moral attitudes toward
homosexual tendencies, which may soon prove to have biological
origins.
Little should be inferred from the fact that attempts to rely on
genetic predispositions have met with infrequent success. Defendants'
cases generally falter on questions of proof; biological defenses have not
been rejected as a matter of law.105 Accordingly, as research progresses,
genetic arguments can be expected to enjoy greater acceptance. 0 6
Cases like Baker and Ewaniszyk then raise another question: how
will society adequately protect itself from individuals who constitute a
genetic threat? Paradoxically, a strong argument can be made that the
California court should have taken precisely the opposite tack. Because
substance abuse was not part of Ewaniszyk's constitution, he was more
capable of complete reformation than Baker, who was doomed to battle
his own nature forever. Thus, genetic predisposition could support an
argument for enhancing rather than mitigating punishment. Just as
those acquitted of crimes by reason of insanity can be removed from
society for longer periods of time than the maximum criminal sentence
for their offenses prescribes, so may the genetically disordered be iso103. Larry Thompson, The Price of Knowledge; Genetic Tests That Predict Dire Conditions
Become a Two-Edged Sword, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1989, at Z7 (noting that according to Norton
Zinder of Rockefeller University, Chair of the NIH genome project advisory committee, "[i]f we
screen 100 genes per person, we would find everyone is seriously ill").
104. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
105. See Simon Le Vay, A Difference in HypothalamicStructure Between Heterosexualand
Homosexual Men, 253 SCIENCE 1034 (1991).
106. On culpability, see, for example, Millard v. State, 261 A.2d 227, 231 n.1 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1970) (finding insufficient proof that an XYY chromosome pattern made the defendant unable to conform his behavior to the law within the meaning of the state's criminal responsibility
statute). See also Commonwealth v. Brennan, 504 N.E.2d 612 (Mass. 1987) (convicting the defendant after a jury determination that the defendant suffered from voluntary alcoholism rather than
organic brain syndrome); Mahla v. State, 496 N.E.2d 568 (Ind. 1986) (permitting a prosecutor to
argue to the jury that homosexuality is not genetically determined). See generally, Deborah
Denno, Human Biology and Criminal Responsibility:Free Will or Free Ride, 137 U. PA. L. REV.

615 (1988); Note, The XYY Defense, 57 GEO. L.J. 892 (1969). See also C.

RAY JEFFERY ET AL.,

ATTACKS ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE: BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY AND NEW PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL

BEHAVIOR (1985); C. RAY JEFFERY, CRIMINOLOGY: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 166-210 (1990).
Courts reach similar results on the issue of punishment. See e.g., Utah v. Gardner, 789 P.2d
273 (Utah 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1837 (1990) (noting the relationship between moral responsibility and the grade of the offense); Roach v. Martin, 757 F.2d 1463, 1474-75 (4th Cir. 1985)
(discussing the relevance of the Huntington's gene to the level of punishment that is appropriate.).
There has also been some attempt to use defective brain physiology as a mitigating circumstance
in criminal cases. See, e.g., State v. Zimmerman, 802 P.2d 1024 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990); Matthew
Heller, Brain Scans on Criminals Create Legal Controversy, REUTERS, Nov. 28, 1989 (LEXIS,
NEXIS file, Reuter library). See also, Nora Volcow & Laurence Tancredi, Biological Correlatesof
Mental Activity, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 439-43 (1991).

1992]

JURISPRUDENCE OF GENETICS

lated for longer periods.10 7 Alternatively, they may be subjected to extreme therapeutic measures such as psychosurgery. Thus, it would not
be surprising if jurisdictions that base sentences on predictions of dangerousness begin to rely on genetic information.10o
Used in this manner, reliance on genetic endowment creates a sort
of status offense. While the offender is not branded responsible for bad
acts, the practical effect is that liberties are truncated and opportunities circumscribed. 109 If it is accepted that genetic endowment determines the propensity to commit bad acts, then hereditary traits, which
often reduce to ethnic group membership, may one day be considered
evidence of the commission of a crime.1 10
The impact of genetic essentialism on concepts of responsibility
can be understood in yet another way. If some individuals cannot be
held accountable for their own misfeasance because of genetic disorders,
then responsibility for the social harm they cause may lie with those
who brought these individuals into being. Now that prenatal screening
and testing techniques are sophisticated enough in many cases to avoid
the birth of a child with genetic anomalies, an ethic of genetic responsi107. In its extreme articulation, genetic determinism posits that everyone is controlled by
genetic endowment; no one has sufficient free will to be held accountable for bad or good actions.
Accordingly, a full acceptance of genetic essentialism would implicate rewards as well as
punishment.
108. See, e.g., TEx. CODE CRIM PROC. ANN. Art. 37.071(b)(1) (West Supp. 1991) (providing
that in the sentencing phase of a capital case, the jury is to consider "whether there is a
probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society"). Cf. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (permitting psychiatrists
to testify about the probability that the defendant would be dangerous in the future).
109. Viewed as a conglomeration of genetic propensities, humans become no different than
animals. Accordingly, dispositions in cases of dangerousness may begin to mirror the treatment of
dangerous pets. See, e.g., Zuniga v. San Mateo Dep't of Health Servs., 267 Cal. Rptr. 755, 760 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1990) (holding that an American pit bull terrier is dangerous within the meaning of a city
ordinance because it "constitutes a menace . . . due to . . . the inherent nature of the animal"
(quoting San Mateo County Ord. § 3330.0(j)(4)); Garcia v. Village of Tijeras, 767 P.2d 355, 362
(N.M. Ct. App. 1988) (enforcing a statute prohibiting ownership of American Pit Bull Terriers
despite proof of gentle training on the ground that these animals have inherent characteristics
making them dangerous).
110. This is not a new idea. In 1911, Cesare Lombroso hypothesized that certain physical
characteristics, such as low slanting foreheads and long ear lobes, indicated a disposition towards
criminal behavior. CESARE LOMBROSO, CRIME: ITS CAUSES AND REMEDIES (1911). Nor have modern
criminologists forgotten this idea. See, e.g., JEFFERY ET AL., supra note 106 (hypothesizing that
physical attributes are related to criminality); Harold P. Green, Genetic Technology: Law and
Policy for the Brave New World, 48 IND. L.J. 559, 571 (1973) (suggesting that one way to combat
crime would be to keep those genetically predisposed to criminal behavior under surveillance). But
cf. Kornegay v. State, 329 S.E.2d 601 (Ga. 1985) (reversing a conviction because the prosecutor
implied in the closing argument that certain races are hereditarily disposed to commit crime).
For the relationship between genetic endowment and ethnic group membership, see infra note
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bility is technically possible.1 11

The impetus for such an ethic is discernable in the wrongful birth
and wrongful life actions brought against health care practitioners who
either fail to offer parents prenatal testing and screening or perform
these tests negligently. Initially, such claims met with little success. As
one court noted in a case brought on behalf of a child with Down's
syndrome:
Whether it is better to have never been born at all rather than to have been born
with serious mental defects is a mystery more properly left to the philosophers and
theologians, a mystery which would lead us into the field of metaphysics, beyond
the realm of our understanding or ability to solve. .

.

.[This] cause of action...

demands a calculation of damages dependent on a comparison between Hobson's
choice 112of life in an impaired state and nonexistence. This the law is incapable of
doing.

Some jurisdictions have enacted statutes to bar tort actions for withholding information that would have led to the termination of life. 1 3
Recently, however, some states have begun to recognize these torts
on the ground that medical responsibility includes the duty to avoid
predictable genetic problems. For example, in Curlender v. Bio-Science
Laboratories1 14 a California court considered a tort action brought on
behalf of Shauna Tamar, who was born with Tay-Sachs disease, an inheritable disorder. Because her parents were members of an ethnic
group particularly vulnerable to this defect, they employed the defendant to determine whether they were carriers of the disease. The laboratory tests revealed they were not; Shauna was conceived and carried to
term without prenatal testing." 5 In reversing the lower court's dismissal
of the action, the court noted the "dramatic increase.

. .

of the medical

knowledge and skill needed to avoid genetic disaster."' ' Finding that
"a deeply held belief in the sanctity of life" and "metaphysics" are not
111. In fact, the medical literature has sketched the contours of an ethic of genetic responsibility. See, e.g., Ellen E.Wright, Note, Father and Mother Know Best: Defining the Liability of
Physicians for Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE L.J. 1488 (1978); Sumner B. Twiss, Jr.,
Ethical Issues in Genetic Screening: Models of Genetic Responsibility, in ETHICAL, SOCIAL AND
LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF SCREENING FOR HUMAN GENETIC DISEASE 245 (Daniel Bergsma ed., 1974).
112. Speck v. Finegold, 408 A.2d 496, 508 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979). The seminal case adopting
this view was Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967). The court found it impossible to
evaluate the difference between life with defects and the "utter void of nonexistence." Id. at 692.
113. For example, a Minnesota statute provides: "No person shall maintain a cause of action
or receive an award of damages on behalf of that person based on the claim that but for the
negligent conduct of another, the person would have been aborted." MINN. STAT. § 145.424 (1)
(1989). This statute was upheld against constitutional challenge in Hickman v. Group Health Plan,
396 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1986).
114. 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
115. The record in the case does not indicate whether accurate prenatal testing would have
led the parents to avoid conceiving any child, or instead to abort a fetus afflicted with the disease.
116. 165 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
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universally accepted as bases for legal rules, 117 the court remanded the
case for trial. Although the court rejected the view that damages could
be assessed by comparing the value of a normal life,.*hich was unattainable for Shauna, with the value of the life Shauna had, it instructed
the trial court to evaluate the pecuniary losses attributable to her condition and'the pain and suffering she would endure during her actual
life span. 118
C.

Opportunity

In some respects, Curlender tracks black letter law. Medical malpractice actions encourage health professionals to take care in the performance of their duties. Furthermore, the decision safeguards the
integrity of procreative choices, thereby furthering the constitutional
interests recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut 1 9 and its progeny. At
the same time, however, the court radically changed the way that the
law viewed people like the Curlenders. Shauna, the bearer of a genetic
disease, and her parents, who carry the traits for her disorder, were
reconceptualized as persons at risk, people whose physical condition removed them from the class of normalcy. 1 0
The special legal attention given the Curlenders may be a twoedged sword. By rejecting the "sanctity of life" principle, the court legitimated the central thesis of genetic essentialism that persons are defined by their genetic qualities. While this provided the Curlenders with
a right to relief, it also implied a willingness to treat wrongful life as,
117. Id. at 486.
118. Id. at 489. See also Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979) (overruling portions of the
Gleitman case discussed in note 112, supra); Garrison v. Medical Center of Delaware, Inc., 581
A.2d 288 (Del. 1990) (recognizing parents' wrongful birth action, but not a child's wrongful life
claim); Gallagher v. Duke University, 638 F. Supp. 979 (M.D.N.C. 1986).
119. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
120. Abby Lippman argues that "[d]isorders and disabilities are not merely physiological or
physical conditions with fixed contours. Rather, they are social products with variable shapes and
distributions." Abby Lippman, Prenatal Genetic Testing and Screening: ConstructingNeeds and
Reinforcing Inequities, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 15, 17 (1991). To demonstrate the point, Lippman
notes that the decision to abort a genetically imperfect fetus depends on social context: whether
the anomaly was visualized on ultrasound, whether the parents were counseled by an obstetrician
or a geneticist, and whether the interval between testing and diagnosis counseling was long or
short. Id. at 36. See also id. at 23; supra note 89; Trupin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982);
Adrienne Asch & Michelle Fine, IntroductionBeyond Pedestals and Shared Dreams: A Left Per-

spective on Disabling Rights and Reproductive Rights, in WOMEN WITH DISABILITIES, ESSAYS IN
PSYCHOLOGY, POLICY AND POLITICS 15 and 297 (Adrienne Asch & Michelle Fine eds., 1988) (noting
the overwhelmingly negative attitudes and bias that the nondisabled display toward those they
regard as disabled); John Robertson, ProcreativeLiberty and Human Genetics, 39 EMORY L.J. 697
(1990); Robert Destro, Guaranteeingthe "Quality" of Life Through Law: The Emerging Right to

a "Good" Life, in

GUARANTEEING THE GOOD LIFE

Werth, How Short is Too Short, N.Y.

TIMEs,

229, 244 (Richard John Neuhaus ed., 1990); Barry

June 16, 1991, § 6, at 14.
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by biology, unsuited to normal opindeed, wrongful: irrevocably bound
12 1
portunities and life experiences.
If widely accepted, this essentialist perspective may provide the
impetus for the adoption of a wide variety of screening practices, creating a genetic underclass consisting of individuals whose genes have
marked them for the "nowhere track." In fact, one health insurer has
already attempted to refuse coverage for a child born with birth defects
when the mother was warned through prenatal testing, but failed to
abort.1 22 Other insurance companies may lower premiums for those individuals unlikely to suffer from hereditary diseases by incorporating
genetic testing into their underwriting methodology. 123 In the workplace, adoption of the essentialist perspective could mean that application procedures will include genetic tests to choose those employees
whose biology makes them most likely to stay healthy and perform
well. 124 Schools could use genetic screening for tracking so that the students who receive expensive educational programs, such as upper-level
mathematics courses and musical training, are those most suited to
1 25
benefit from them.
121. Willingness to treat certain lives as wrongful is, of course, not a new practice. See, e.g.,
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding the application of a sterilization statute because
"[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough") (Holmes, J.). Nor is this a practice that has largely
disappeared. Some states, for example, retain sterilization statutes. See Richard A. Estacio, Sterilization of the Mentally Disabled in Pennsylvania:Three Generations Without Legislative Guidance Are Enough, 92 DICK. L. REv. 409, 417-28 (1988). See also Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 420
(1908) (sustaining a law limiting the working hours of women on the ground that a "woman's
physical structure . . . justif[ies] special legislation"); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130,
141 (1873) (upholding a statute barring women from the practice of law on the ground that "[tihe
natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for
many of the occupations of civil life" and because "the paramount destiny and mission of woman
are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother") (Bradley, J., concurring).
122. Thompson, supra note 103.
123. Cf. Life Ins. Ass'n v. Commissioner of Ins., 530 N.E.2d 168 (Mass. 1988) (allowing insurance underwriters to exclude from coverage persons identified as HIV-infected and therefore likely
to contract AIDS); Health Ins. Ass'n v. Corcoran, 551 N.Y.S.2d 615 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (same);
Benjamin Schatz, The AIDS Insurance Crisis: Underwritingor Overreaching?,100 HARV. L. REV.
1782 (1987); Katherine Brokaw, Genetic Screening in the Workplace and Employers' Liability, 23
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 317, 327 n.49 (1990) (citing cases in which genetic diseases have been
excluded from coverage as "pre-existing conditions").
124. See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, GENETIC MONITORING AND
SCREENING IN THE WORKPLACE

10-12 (1990) [hereinafter

GENETIc MoNrrORING]

(noting the exis-

tence of fifty diseases that make individuals susceptible to occupational diseases and suggesting
that genetic tests ultimately will be developed to identify workers with the predisposition toward
these diseases); Richard Severo, DuPont Defends Genetic Screening, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1981,
§ 1, at 31; Constance Holden, Air Force Challenged on Sickle Trait Policy, 211 SCIENCE 257
(1981); Mark A. Rothstein, Employee Selection Based on Susceptibility to OccupationalIllness,
81 MICH. L. REV. 1379 (1983).
125. See, e.g., Larry P. by Lucille P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that
absent a showing that an IQ test is inaccurate, tracking children according to their scores does not
violate the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1491 (1988)). See also
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Ironically, the scientific developments that make these practices
possible come at a time when mainstreaming has become the subject of
significant legislative activity. 126 Although recent enactments seem to
offer safeguards, such legislative action may not adequately circumscribe many uses of genetic information. The purpose of this type of
legislation is apparently to protect individuals from bias, not to implement a social commitment to spend the resources needed to extend opportunities broadly to disabled individuals. Thus, as long as a
decisionmaker, such as an employer, educator, or insurance company,
can persuasively argue that biological differences matter, discrimination
may not be actionable. This view was, perhaps, first enunciated in GenNELKIN & TANCREDI, supra note 5; Constance Holden, Female Math Anxiety on the Wane, 236
SCIENCE 660, 661 (1987) (quoting a statement of Susan F. Chipman of the U.S. Office of Naval

Research that "people are just too interested" in whether women have inherently less cognitive
ability in mathematics).
Many states currently screen newborns for PKU deficiencies in order to treat those afflicted.
See supra note 7. Jurisdictions have occasionally considered other mass screenings. See Green,
supra note 110, at 561 & 568 (arguing that a constitutional challenge to mass screenings would
probably be rejected on the authority of Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 211 (1905)). See also
Meracle v. Children's Serv. Soc'y of Wisconsin, 437 N.W.2d 532 (Wis. 1989) (involving a suit
against an adoption agency for failing to identify a child as genetically disposed to Huntington's
disease).
126. See, for example, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104
Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), which became effective in 1992. The
Act prohibits employers from discriminating "against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,

conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a) (West Supp. 1991). The Act also
bars "medical examination. .,as to whether such applicant is an individual with a disability." Id.
§ 12112(c)(2)(A). However, a substantial question as to how this measure will affect those with
genetic predispositions to disease remains. Such individuals are not currently impaired, and therefore do not fit squarely within the statutory category of persons protected. See GENETIC MONIrORING, supra note 124, at 115. Further, the interpretive guidance to the regulations promulgated by
the EEOC exclude "predisposition to illness or disease" from the definition of impairment. Equal
Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726 (1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630). Even if genetic disorders were covered, an employer may argue that such
a condition is "job-related," 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c)(2)(B), or within the "business necessity" defense,
id. §§ 12112(c)(4)(A) and 12113(a). But see 136 CONG. REc. H4627 (daily ed. July 12, 1990) (statement of Rep. Waxman) (stating that "I should not[e] that the employment protections of the ADA
will be important, as well, for people who are identified through new genetic tests as being carriers
of a disease-associated gene.. . . [A] carrier of [a] disease-associated gene is protected in employment as long as such individual is qualified for the job in question. The determination . . .may
not be based on speculation and predictions regarding the person's ability to be qualified for the
job in the future.").
Other provisions that arguably protect individuals with genetic problems include the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794
(1988)); the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (recently renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of Oct. 30, 1990), Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988) (codified, in part, at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3614a (1988)).
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eral Electric Co. v. Gilbert127 and Geduldig v. Aiello. 12s In these cases
the Supreme Court found that insurance programs that excluded pregnancy and childbirth from coverage did not violate Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964129 or the Constitution because they did not
discriminate against women. Although this result was modified by the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA),130 the genetic essentialist's focus on raw biology continues to dominate the interpretation of
equal protection legislation.
Both the Seventh Circuit and Supreme Court opinions in UAW v.
Johnson Controls'3 1 illustrate current assumptions. Citing Title VII
and the PDA, the plaintiffs in this case challenged a battery manufacturer's policy of excluding fertile women-all women under age seventy
who were not demonstrably incapable of bearing children-from manufacturing positions involving lead products and from the jobs that
would lead to promotion to such positions. The employment policy was
sustained by the court of appeals. Because the lead in the batteries endangered fetuses, the court reasoned that the bona fide occupational
qualification or business necessity defense applied. According to the
court, innate physical differences between people justify disparate
treatment.3 2
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, but its decision
may not assure adequate protection for those with genetic disorders.
The Court, noting that lead also affects the male reproductive system,
invalidated the company's policy for being less neutral than it appeared,' 3 leaving open the possibility that genetic policies lacking this
underinclusive aspect will be upheld. More importantly, the Court devoted considerable attention to the wider ramifications of a particular
fertile female's decision to work with lead. It noted that the defendant
would probably not be liable to the fetus for lead exposure caused by its
mother's occupational choice.13 4 In addition, the Court expressly ap127. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
128. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
129. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988)).
130. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988)).
131. 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
132. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 895. The court also noted that "more is at stake than the
individual woman's decision" to risk her own safety:
The risks to the unborn child from lead are also shared by society in the form of government
financed programs to train or maintain a handicapped child in non-institutional or institutional environments and to provide the child with the training necessary to overcome the
mental and physical harm attributable to lead exposure.
Id. at 897-98.
133. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1203.
134. Id. at 1208.
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proved Dothard v. Rawlinson'3 5 and other cases that upheld biological
discrimination aimed at limiting risks to third persons. 136
Many potential uses of genetic information have economically useful consequences, such as minimizing the costs of making the workplace
safe, conserving limited educational resources, or containing the cost of
insurance, and therefore are likely-to survive challenges similar to those
mounted in Johnson Controls.5 7 Of course, this projection may be
overly pessimistic. As more genetic disorders are identified, the "normal" population may be reduced to the point at which genetic discrimination becomes 'unfeasible. Furthermore, legislative clarifications
similar to the PDA may be forthcoming.13 8 In addition, state laws may
help limit the reach of essentialist reasoning. Indeed, some legislatures
have already demonstrated interest in curbing genetic discrimination in
the workplace. 3 9 But no matter how finely drawn the legislation, if per135. 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (upholding minimum height and weight requirements for prison
guards, reasoning that the impact on women was justified by security considerations).
136. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1205. See also Regulations to Implement the Equal
Employment Act Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,734, 35,738
(1991) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2)) (permitting employers to require as a qualification standard that an individual not "pose a direct threat to the health or safety of the individual
or others in the workplace").
137. Equal protection legislation like Title VII, which enumerates the groups targeted for
protection, is also unlikely to be helpful. Although genetic disorders are immutable, a Court that
prefers to rely on the plain meaning of statutes is unlikely to regard them as covered by the legislation. Cf. West Virginia Univ. Hosps, Inc. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138, 1148-49 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (accusing the lower court of using "the implements of literalism to wound, rather than
to minister to, congressional intent" when holding that the term "reasonable attorneys fees" in 42
U.S.C. § 1988 (1988) does not include expert witness fees). Thus, these statutes are usually at issue
only because the genetic problem is coterminous with membership in an expressly protected class.
While people generally select partners who share their ethnicity so that many genetic diseases are
confined to specific groups (American Blacks for the sickle-cell trait; Blacks, Mediterranean Jews,
Greeks, and Sardinians for glucose-6-phosphate dehydrogenase (G-6-PD) deficiency), not all genetic problems are confined to specific ethnic groups. For example, because Huntington's disease
and colon cancer shorten work lives, they may become the subject of screening, but their incidence
is wide. See GENETiC MONITORING, supra note 124, at 84; Michael R. Hayden et al., Predictive
Testing for Huntington's Disease Using Linked DNA Markers, 319(9) NEW ENG. J. MED. 583
(1988); Mark Leppert et al., Genetic Analysis of an Inherited Predispositionto Colon Cancer in a
Family With a Variable Number of Adenomatus Polyps, 322(13) NEW ENG. J. MED. 904 (1990).
138. For example, testing aimed at excluding from the workplace individuals who are genetically hypersusceptible to contaminants may be motivated by the Occupational Safety and Health
Act's requirement that employers maintain a workplace "free from recognized hazards." 29 U.S.C.
§ 654(a)(1) (1988). The Act was created "to assure . . . every working man and woman in the
Nation safe and healthful working conditions." Id. at § 651(b). See Ellen R. Peirce, The Regulation of Genetic Testing in the Workplace-A Legislative Proposal, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 771, 822
(1985). Congress could amend this measure specifically to protect these workers from job loss. It
could, for instance, require employers to provide such employees with equivalent employment or
impose a high burden of proving that the workplace could not, at reasonable expense, be made safe
for hypersusceptible workers.
139. New Jersey, for example, prohibits employment discrimination based on an "atypical
hereditary cellular or blood trait," N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West Supp. 1991), which includes
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sons are conceptualized as aggregates of physical attributes and genestransmitting agents, the law may make biology dispositive of
opportunity.
IV. A LONGER VIEW
The previous Part demonstrated that genetic essentialism, by altering the perception of the person, has challenged core legal precepts. We
do not, however, mean to imply that biologically-oriented reasoning is
always inappropriate. In certain respects, the essentialist perspective is
fundamental to the American ethos, related to ideologies of progress
and perfection and to the focus on the individual. More generally, in its
promises of neutrality, predictability, and certainty, science holds extraordinary appeal for the legal system. Indeed, because this Nation has
profited so profoundly from scientific advances, its reliance on science
as a source for law is almost inevitable.
Yet Part III demonstrated certain systematic problems with the
way that lawmakers respond to science-based claims. In the cases reviewed, genetic reasoning tended to pervade the decisionmaking process, preempting discussion of other values at stake. In the rush to
incorporate recent research into law, the norms inherent in customary
law often were obscured and ultimately ignored. Once biological arguments were made, their relevance was rarely challenged; rather, the proceedings tended to shift to questions about the validity and
representative nature of the scientific information proferred.
In our view, this approach is simplistic. Certainty and predictability have particular meanings within science that are not easily transferred to the legal arena. Furthermore, the assumption that science is
value-neutral bears close scrutiny. Thus, although science-based arguments are worthy of careful consideration, they are not intrinsically dispositive. This Part analyzes the sources of the intuition that law should
incorporate science in general, and biology in particular, in order to
clarify the questions that ought to be asked whenever science is brought
to bear on legal issues. We do not, and cannot, offer universal guidelines, for the relevance of scientific input varies according to the nature
of the controversy, the interests involved, and the limits of the scientific
inquiry that has yielded the information at issue.
traits for sickle cell, hemoglobin C, thalessemia, Tay-Sachs, and cystic fibrosis. OFFICE OF TEcHNOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESs., THE ROLE OF GENETIC TESTING IN THE PREVENTION OF

OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE 128 (Comm. Print 1983). Florida, Louisiana, and North Carolina all bar
discrimination on the basis of sickle cell trait.See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.075 (West 1981); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 23:1002 (West 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.1 (1975).
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Neutrality

The extraordinary deference paid to science is based, in part, on
assumptions about its value neutrality. Science is considered uncontaminated with political values and therefore an objective arbiter of truth.
Because of its perceived value neutrality, science has been a political
resource-a way to define and legitimize governmental actions as impersonal, rational, and value-free. 14 0 As philosopher Stephen Toulmin
argues, society accepts ideas about nature not only for their explanatory
power, but for the legitimacy they provide for the political and social
system. 4 In a society in which fundamental values are the source of
considerable debate, an apparently neutral basis for law is highly
seductive.
But the image of neutrality-the claim that facts can be separated
from values-is largely a myth, originating in the efforts of scientists to
maintain autonomy in the face of pressures from the church and from
the state. In fact, the history of science and numerous contemporary
studies suggest that the choice of research topics, the nature of scientific theories, and the representation of research results are socially constructed, shaped by cultural forces, and defined to reflect the priorities
and assumptions of particular societies at particular times. 4 2 Furthermore, scientific information is interpreted and applied in a political
context and is filtered through social lenses. Defining what is "natural,"
science is readily appropriated as a way to conform individuals to institutional values and existing social or political conventions. 43
The history of the nature/nurture dispute is illustrative of the extent to which the appeal of scientific claims rests more on social and
ideological value than on scientific validity. 4 4 In The Origin of Species," Charles Darwin explained the evolution of species using a theory
of natural selection in which the fittest, or the most adaptable, survived
long enough to reproduce. Darwinian concepts of natural selection were
quickly adopted in the late nineteenth century as "Social Darwinism," a
biological defense of the changing forces of industrialization: Social
Darwinism was "conceived in and dedicated to an age of steel and
steam engines, competition, exploitation, and struggle."'1 46 These con140. See YARON EZRAHI, THE DESCENT OF ICARUS: SCIENCE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACY (1990).
141. See STEPHEN TOULMIN, COSMOPOLIs: THE HIDDEN AGENDA OF MODERNITY (1990).
142.
144.

See PROCTOR, supra note 2. See also supra note 58.
See MARY DOUGLAS, How INSTITUTIONS THINK (1986).
DANIEL J. KEVLES, I N THE NAME OF EUGENICS (1985).

145.

CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES

143.

146.
1970).

(1858).

Richard Hofstadter, The Vogue of Spencer, in

DARWIN

489, 490 (Philip Appleman ed.,
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cepts were tools for explaining the persistence of poverty and inequity:
147
those best fitted to cope survive.
By the early twentieth century the genetic theories of Gregor Mendel and the eugenic ideas of Francis Galton were being used to prove
that deviant behavior and low IQ were hereditary, and to justify eugenic programs that would encourage more prolific breeding among
those deemed superior and discourage reproduction among the socially
disadvantaged.148 Concerns about the economic dislocations and political upheavals caused by industrialization, immigration, and the changing ethnic composition of cities created a need for categorization and
classification. Genetic labels satisfied this need.149
This pre-War interpretation of the significance of genetics changed
after the Holocaust, not because science was rejected as a basis for lawmaking, but because Nazi policies had dramatized the social implications of eugenics. 150 At the same time, the optimism of the 1950s and
1960s encouraged the ascendancy of nurture over nature, and the corresponding belief that if environmental conditions were optimized, individuals could assert plenary control over their own destinies. In the
criminal context, rehabilitation was favored over punishment;15 ' in the
social sphere, the home environment was considered essential to the
formation of the individual; 52 in schools, all children were regarded as
equally educable: learning deficiencies were attributed to problems in
the family or the environment.153 The economic programs of the Great
Society represented the panacea. Crude Mendelian explanations for behavior were supplemented by scientific theories that emphasized the effects of environment and opportunity as the government assumed a
significant role in securing prosperity for every individual. 5
The recent reemergence of a genetic perspective should be seen,
then, as stemming not only from dramatic advances in biomedical research, but also from a desire to utilize scientific explanations to justify
a reorientation of social policy. As Part II of this Article demonstrated,
147. See CARL N. DEGLER, IN
148. KEVLES, supra note 144.
149.
OF MAN

150.

(1991).

SEARCH OF HUMAN NATURE

BENNO MULLER-HILL, MURDEROUS SCIENCE

(1988);

STEPHEN J. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE

(1981).
See ROBERT N. PROCTOR, RACIAL HYGIENE: MEDICINE UNDER THE NAZIS (1988).

151. See

JAMES B. JACOBS, STATESVILLE: THE PENITENTIARY IN MASS SOCIETY (1977) (demonstrating the changing relationship between prison and the larger society); DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY:

A

STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY

(1990).

152.

See

JOSEPH VERNOFF ET AL., THE INNER AMERICAN:

(1981).
153.

See

PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED

A SELF
(1974);

PORTRAIT FROM

1957

TO

1976

IRVING HARRIS, EMOTIONAL

BLOCKS TO LEARNING: A STUDY OF THE REASONS FOR FAILURE IN SCHOOL (1962).
154. See DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, MAXIMUM FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING: COMMUNITY ACTION IN
THE WAR ON POVERTY

(1969).

19921

JURISPRUDENCE OF GENETICS

many definitions of "personhood" are possible; the biological definition
guiding the cases reviewed in Part III represents not a value-neutral
choice, but a normative decision, one that emanates from the social
problems of this era just as reliance on eugenics reflected the social concerns of other times. Genetics has provided a rationale for repudiating
the objectives of the post-War period and shifting responsibility for
personal welfare from society back to the individual.
That scientific arguments are not completely value-neutral is not,
of course, a reason to reject them. Rather, this lack of value neutrality
means that science-based claims must be parsed with care before they
are incorporated into the fabric of the law. Their appeal reflects popular views on contemporary policy; their factual dimensions set the parameters of debate over current controversies. But normative
components must be recognized as such and the distortions caused by
the politics of agenda-setting should be taken into account.
Consider, for example, employment practices such as the one challenged in Johnson Controls.1 55 Research into the cause of birth defects
holds promise for securing a healthy population, because only by understanding the causes of disease can methods of prevention be devised.
However, basing employment decisions on the fruits of that research
requires more than mere verification of the validity of the scientific
findings. Thus, before women were excluded from the workplace on the
basis of the research at issue in Johnson Controls, it would have been
useful to know whether similar studies were conducted on men or
whether cultural stereotyping led scientists to look only to mothers for
the source of fetal harm. Even if studies determined that only maternal
exposure was harmful, the question remains whether the best solution
would be to burden one relatively less powerful segment of society or to
make the workplace safer. 156 Scientific research may contribute to the
resolution of this question by identifying the number of people afflicted
with biological vulnerability to a work environment and by quantifying
the costs of cleanup. But the fact that research has revealed a predisposition to workplace problems should not by itself drive exclusionary
policies.

155. See supra text accompanying notes 131-36.
156. Similarly, the distinction between cases like Baker v. State Bar, 781 P.2d 1344 (Cal.
1989), and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), may turn on the greater attention that scientists pay to problems such as alcohol abuse, which affect the middle class, rather than problems
like homosexuality, which are perceived as afflicting the less powerful.
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Predictability

At the very least, science seems to promise predictability. In a society that perceives itself as threatened by both man-made and natural
dangers, methodologies of prediction are highly valued. Such methodologies seem to secure a measure of control over the environment, creating foreknowledge if not choice. Thus, we observe the recent
development of many new fields-technology assessment, risk analysis,
social forecasting-focused on prediction and control. For the law, the
predictability of science is especially seductive. Influencing future behavior is, after all, the crux of lawmaking. Furthermore, applying rules
in particular cases would certainly be easier if decisionmakers could
know in advance the effects of particular dispositions.
Again, it is important to parse the content of the science under
consideration. This is particularly difficult in law because the vocabulary of scientists and lawyers is so different. Thus, scientists speak of
correlation, a statistically-driven concept that lawyers tend to reduce to
"cause," thereby losing the probabilisitic feature of the scientific claim.
In the genetic context, the terms used are "predisposed" and "at risk."
In science, these mean that the individual is vulnerable to a disease
that may or may not be expressed in the future. In law, however, the
terms seem to define current status. Courts may regard an individual
whom science deems "at risk" as deserving differential treatment even
before it is known whether the risk will materialize, as the Curlender
and Johnson Controls courts did. Thus, people diagnosed as predisposed to hereditary disease may find themselves treated as if they were
carriers of disorders certain to achieve expression, even when the relationship between genetic defects and their manifestations in behavior
15
or disease is conditional. 7
The problems associated with the use of statistical information in
law are too well rehearsed to require discussion here.' 5 8 Techniques like
the genetic screening that employers and schools use should be recognized as another form of stereotyping, albeit in a technologically sophisticated guise. Treating people according to genetic makeup is not
unreasoned in the sense that bigotry is unreasoned. However, decision157. See NELKIN & TANCREDI, supra note 5, at 87-105 (noting that some of the workers excluded from the workplace because of genetic hypersusceptibility to certain chemicals, congenital
back problems, and the sickle-cell trait were asymptomatic and that in many cases, there was no
assurance that the worker identified would ever become sick as a result of working conditions).
158. See, e.g., Randolph N. Jonakait, When Blood is Their Argument: Probabilitiesin Criminal Cases, Genetic Markers, and, Once Again, Bayes' Theorem, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 369; Lea
Brilmayer & Lewis Kornhauser, Review: QuantitativeMethods and Legal Decisions, 46 U. CHL L.
REV. 116 (1978); Laurence Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971).
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making based on predisposition has the same effect as prejudice: it deprives individuals of opportunities because of group characteristics that
they may not actually share. 159 Thus, if the nation's commitment to
equality is understood as more than merely a prohibition against bigotry, genetic information ought not be considered dispositive of
opportunity.
Another strategy for using genetic information appropriately may
be to distinguish between predictive uses and explanatory applications.
Predictions of future dangerousness, ineducability, or occupational disease, for example, emphasize the immutability of physical attributes
and create self-fulfilling prophecies by labeling asymptomatic individuals as "predisposed." In contrast, explanatory uses of biological information can often be helpful. Once the root of a manifest disability is
diagnosed, notions of culpability can be revised as they were in Baker
or discarded as perhaps they should be in the case of homosexual sodomy laws. Moreover, the environment can, if necessary, be altered to
accommodate those with biological susceptibilities.
C. Certainty
The appeal of scientific explanations in law also reflects a need to
reduce ambiguity. Science seems precise, and appears to avoid subjectivity and to limit the role of interpretation. In particular, genetic research offers seemingly definitive answers at a time of frustration with
the vagueness of other disciplines, and it provides apparently concrete
information in the face of demands for efficiency and accountability.1 6 0
The search for certainty and efficiency has encouraged lawmakers to
define problems as technical, as resolvable by expertise. Concerned with
reducing ambiguity, decisionmakers tend to define issues in the apparently rigorous terms of science rather than in social or political terms.' 6 '
It is critical not to conflate the certainty of scientific findings with
the legal relevance of research results. Scientists can define their
problems and control their experiments to produce definitive answers.
Because the universe in which the findings are applied is not so neat,
however, science can rarely offer complete answers to real world
159. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978); Arizona Governing
Comm'n v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983) (per curiam) (invalidating pension fund plans that treated
women differently from men because, statistically, women live longer then men). See also LAU-

RENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrruTioNAL LAW 1579-1580 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that "[i]mplicit in
these decisions is the recognition that gender sometimes denotes, as a valid statistical generalization, biological differences which in certain contexts put women as a group at a disadvantage that

women as individuals should not be forced to suffer").
160.
161.

See, e.g., NELKIN & TANCREDI, supra note 5, at 106-132.
See CONTROVERSY: POLITICS OF TECHNICAL DECISIONS (Dorothy Nelkin, ed., 3d ed. 1992).
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problems. Accordingly, it is wrong to allow science to preempt debate
on the continuing validity of long-accepted principles.
Indeed, in many instances, lawmakers appear to use scientific research in a manner that scientists would not contemplate. Scientists are
slow to credit new findings or to embrace new theories that contradict
common intuitions and accepted paradigms.1 62 In the cases reviewed in
Part III, however, courts readily abandoned enduring precepts captured
in customary law in the face of recent research. A better approach
would be to scrutinize challenges to fundamental legal concepts as rigorously as scientists would question observations that undermine equivalently central scientific principles. Thus, in cases like Baker, where the
deterministic elements of modern biology conflict with deeply seated
notions about the relationship between culpability and free will, the
strategy ought to be one of harmonization, of finding concepts of responsibility that acknowledge that individuals differ in their capacity to
conform to rules.16 3
Furthermore, as Laurence Tribe observed in another context, it is
important to keep in mind the tendency of quantifiable parameters to
swamp more diffuse interests.16 4 The role of DNA testing in family law
provides an illustration of the inherent dangers here. The family courts
may have greeted DNA testing with such enthusiasm because unambiguous identification of a child's paternity apparently allows judges to
avoid the difficult task of examining the complex psychology of an
Anna Johnson or an Angie Lee Coburn and permits them to resolve
custody disputes with alacrity. In this regard, the use of DNA tests in
family disputes appears to mirror their application in criminal identification. In neither situation is the identity of the "perpetrator" subject
to serious dispute once a genetic linkage is established.
In fact, the issues are not comparable. A criminal trial centers on a
past event: the central question is who committed the crime. In custody
cases, however, the focal point is the continuing responsibility for raising a child. Granted, it can be difficult to determine what is in that
child's best interest; courts can and often do err. But the capacity of
modern biology to determine the historical question of who created a
child represents only one of the factors to be considered in choosing
162. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). See also Geoffrey
Joseph, Interpretation in the Physical Sciences, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 9 (1985).
163. See, e.g., WOLF, supra note 29. See also infra text accompanying notes 170-71.
164. Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not To Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for
Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315 (1974). Cf. Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law & Economics, 78 CAL. L. REV. 815, 845 (1990) (noting that other social sciences have not had the impact
of law and economics because they have not come nearly "as far in providing quantifiable justifications for legal rules").
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custodial arrangements. A child with a manifest genetic disease may be
better off raised by a parent who suffers from the same disorder. Or,
genetic information may help the custodial parent avoid situations that
will aggravate a condition to which the child is genetically predisposed.
But as long as current standards prevail, and the child's best interest
governs, values like stability, privacy, and parental autonomy remain
important. Biology does not offer a determinative answer, only an easy
one.
Nor is it always true that science offers unambiguous answers
within its own sphere. For example, many molecular biologists object to
the direction in which behavioral psychologists have taken genetic analysis.1" 5 Although the behaviorists now emphasize the influence of nature, the biologists argue that even if the human genome is completely
mapped, the nature/nurture question will remain indeterminant; that
identifying a genetic predisposition reveals little about the extent to
which environmental interactions will affect its expression. 166 Because
lawmakers lack the facility to decide which group of scientists is correct, the focus of the law should not be on devising rules to reflect the
winning side, but instead, on finding ways to incorporate scientific findings into law in a manner that reflects the duality of environment and
biology. Thus, it is appropriate to acknowledge the contribution of genetics in exposing the theoretical flaw of cultural determinism, which
tended to treat individuals as exactly alike. At the same time, however,
recognizing differences in human potential does not resolve the central
debate over Great Society programs. Science may be able to quantify
the resources necessary to create an environment that compensates for
biological differences, but it cannot resolve questions about whether
and where these resources should be expended.
D.

The Invisible Hand

For the purposes of this Article, it is also important to consider the
special appeal of biological research. An interesting aspect of the legal
theory that draws on genetic concepts is its striking similarity to some
of the law and economics literature. Free market economics postulates
the existence of utility maximizers whose individual choices guide the
economy to generate the goods society needs at prices near the cost of
production. Similarly, the genetic model posits the existence of individuals genetically endowed to behave in a manner that generates a cus165. Paul R. Billings et al. The Genetic Analysis of Human Behavior: A New Era?, Soc. ScL
& MED. (forthcoming 1992).
166. Many psychologists also make this point. See Douglas Wahlsten, Insensitivity of the
Analysis of Variance to Heredity-Environment Interaction, 13 BEHAV. & BRAIN SC. 109 (1990).
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tomary law governing the social order at low cost.1 6 7 These theories are
attractive because they make external control, whether over the economy or the social order, appear counterproductive. Both seemingly justify a retreat from the difficult task of social planning and both
legitimate the dominance of those who have, be it property or breeding,
over those who have not.
This parallel, although not perfect, is helpful because it offers another approach for refining essentialist theory. Economists recognize
that their models only approximate reality, that the consumer is not
always rational and does not always know how to maximize utility.
They also realize that some of the parameters used are poorly understood. 168 Accordingly, before theoretical conclusions are applied to concrete cases, economists generally attempt to modify their models in
light of these uncertainties. The task for genetic essentialists is no different. It would be interesting to see, for example, what genetic essentialism would look like if it included not only reciprocal altruism and
selfishness as biologically determined, but also the possibility that genes
are programmed for wider forms of cooperation and a taste for living
under a regime of culturally-determined rules. 169
Similarly, now that a genetic model has been proposed, its assumptions could be relaxed to better account for the etiology of complex
human behavior and disease. Economic models do not derive their powerful heuristic capacity from reductionism alone. Rather, they work because they retain enough of the characteristics of the real world to be
recognizable. In contrast, the simplifications of biological determinism
often confound common intuitions and established practices. 171 We saw,
for example, how the focus on genetic predisposition to crime seems to
negate the moral basis essential to just punishment. Enriching the
model would therefore be helpful. Once again the approach of those
philosophers who argue that determinism is compatible with free will is
useful, for it creates an understanding of personal responsibility that
167. Early legal theorists used a Darwinian metaphor slightly differently: they substituted
judges for market participants, and asked whether the common law would evolve through these
judges' individual decisions. Elliott, supra note 6. But the emphasis was nevertheless on the ability
of society to generate what it needs without centralized decisionmaking.
168. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 15-17 (3d ed. 1986); WILLIAM
M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 9-24 (1987).
169. Cf. Herbert A. Simon, A Mechanism for Social Selection and Successful Altruism, 250
SCIENCE, 1665 (1987) (hypothesizing that there may be natural selection for docility because it
enables individuals to learn, adapt, and accept the imposition of values that are good for society as
a whole). See also Richard A. Epstein, A Taste for Privacy? Evolution and the Emergence of a
NaturalisticEthic, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 665 (1980).
170. See, e.g., Peter Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in FREE WILL 59, 62-64 (Gary Watson ed., 1982).
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takes biological endowment into account." 1 This approach would, in
addition, more accurately reflect scientific reality, for recent studies
demonstrate the complexity with which genetic disorders interact with
1 72
other physical factors and environmental circumstances.
Finally, genetic essentialists tend not to look beyond their model.
Beckstrom, for example, would distribute estates according to a genetic
plan without regard for acculturated values. Most free market economists, in contrast, are not so doctrinaire. There is, for instance, general
agreement that market failures occur and should be corrected externally, even if there is sharp debate over the definition of failure and the
direction that correction should take. If genetic essentialists participated in the same level of discussion, there would be less cause for
concern.
Even if the genetic model cannot furnish a source of positive law, it
makes a valuable contribution by emphasizing the natural constraints
within which the law must operate. Thus, Beckstrom sometimes speaks
of sociobiology as facilitative of lawmaking, arguing that it is crucial for
lawmakers to be aware of humankind's tendencies so they can understand the conditions under which rules are likely to be obeyed.17 3 This
approach adopts the wisdom offered by science without using it normatively to justify policies with profound implications for accepted values.
This pragmatic usage has an important legal pedigree of its own. For
example, the constitutional separation of powers scheme was intended
to exploit natural human inclinations.1 74 Biological insights could also
be applied to antitrust law, where behavioral modalities are clearly at
issue; 1 5 environmental protection, where the survival of the species and
171. See, e.g., WOLF, supra note 29.
172. Alcoholism, for example, has been the subject of several such studies. See, e.g., Karen
M. Abram, The Effect of Co-occurring Disorders on Criminal Careers:Interaction of Antisocial
Personality, Alcoholism, and Drug Disorders, 12 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 133 (1990); C. Robert
Cloninger et al., Effects of Changes in Alcohol Use Between Generations on Inheritance of Alco-

hol Abuse, in

ALCOHOLISM: ORIGINS AND OUTCOME

49 (Robert M. Rose & James E. Barrett, eds.

1988).

173. See, e.g., JOHN H. BECKSTROM, EVOLUTIONARY JURISPRUDENCE 17-18 (1989). Using child
support as an example, Beckstrom argues that because people are programmed to perpetuate their
own genes, support is more likely to be forthcoming if orders requiring males to support children
are linked to proof of paternity. Id. at 48-53.
174. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison). Constitutional interpretation reflects
this realization as well. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-51 (1983); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 120-24 (1976) (per curiam); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593-94
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 292-95 (1926) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
175. See, e.g., John S. Wiley, Jr., Reciprocal Altruism as a Felony: Antitrust and the Prisoner's Dilemma, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1906 (1988); ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION

(1984); Peter Huber, Competition, Conglomerates, and the Evolution of Cooperation, 93

YALE L.J. 1147 (1984).
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the role of humans in the biosphere are in question;' 7 6177and that branch
of privacy law that seeks to protect personal dignity.
V.

CONCLUSION

Research in molecular biology is yielding important genetic information that may well be appropriately utilized in the law. Current scientific advances offer the legal system useful information, reducing
ambiguity in many areas and defining meaningful constraints in others.
But given the cultural appeal of science, and particularly genetic assumptions, as neutral information, the tendency is to apply these assumptions beyond the point of actual demonstration and beyond their
relevance to particular situations. Lawmakers are attracted by the apparent certainty and predictions promised by a genetic "map." But
there are also risks. In the rush to incorporate new scholarship, the
highly complex and poorly understood relationship between genetics
and environment, between nature and nurture, may be grossly oversimplified. With the desire to find unambiguous solutions, more traditional
values, such as equal opportunity, personal privacy, and individual and
family autonomy, may be obscured. In this Article, we argued that genetic assumptions must be examined skeptically before they are allowed
to alter concepts such as personhood, normalcy, responsibility, and culpability that are fundamental to the law.
In recent years, medicine has begun to assess the appropriate use
of new technologies. The law must also deal with such advances, for
scientific information should not be indiscriminately applied. Analyzing
the way in which scientific findings are brought to bear on legal questions is an issue that we are only beginning to grapple with today. Identifying the criteria for utilizing these powerful new conceptualizations
in jurisprudence will surely occupy the next generation of legal scholars.

176. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Justice Across the Generations, 67 TEx. L. REV. 1465
(1989); Jared des Rosiers, Note, The Exemption Process under the EndangeredSpecies Act: How
the "God Squad" Works and Why, 66 NOTRE DAmE L. REV. 825, 828-30 (1991).
177. See, e.g., Anderson v. Fisher Broadcasting Co., 712 P.2d 803 (Or. 1986); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68
CORNELL L. REV. 291, 332-35, 350 (1983); Jack Hirshleifer, Privacy: Its Origin, Function, and Fu-

ture, 9 J. LEGAL

STUD.

649 (1980).

